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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD WILSON AMMERMAN, by his Guardian ad
Li tern, La Verne Bruce Ammerman, and EDDIE SOLIZ,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
10,574

FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs-Respondents to recover from the Defendant-Appellant
insurance company the amount of a prior judgment
in excess of the policy limits contracted for by the
insured, Ammerman. The Appellant has submitted
a Brief in this appeal and now replies to Respondent's Brief.
No statement of facts will be attempted here
since it would be merely repetitive of Appellant's
first Brief.
It is Appellant's purpose by this brief to point
1
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out the errors in Respondents' Brief which bear
materially upon the issues in the case. In reply Appellant, therefore, respectfully submits the following:
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Appellant first wishes to point out that throughout Respondents' Statement Of Fads they continue
to do what was attempted throughout the trial of
this action, i.e. a retrial of the first case by focusing
attention on the details of Soliz's alleged injuries
rather than directing their inquiry towards facts
evidencing bad faith by the Defendant. In the Statement Of Facts on page 4 of Respondents' Brief,
Soliz's trial testimony concerning his injuries is
quoted at length notwithstanding the fact that
the transcript of the prior trial was never
presented in the trial of the present action,
although it was submitted for evidence to
the pre-trial judge. In this and many other instances throughout Respondents' Brief an attempt
is made to present evidence not submitted to the jury
in the trial of this action. On pages 21 and 22 of
their Brief Respondents cite the transcript of the
previous case to show that Appellant's counsel had
consented to a finding of negligence as a matter of
law. However, this also was not presented as evidence in the trial of this matter, and merely clouds
the true issue in this case - whether the verdict of
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bad faith was supported by any clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. The Respondents' facts
and arguments are directed to the proposition that
if the verdict in the previous case was supportable
by the evidence Appellant is ipso facto guilty of bad
faith for not settling within the policy limits. Of
course, this is not the inquiry nor the correct rule
of law in this action.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II.
Respondents begin their argument in support
of the verdict by citing an instruction of the trial
court which defined bad faith as constituting not
a mistake of judgment but rather an "interested
or sinister motive", but then paradoxically Respondents proceed to argue that the test of bad faith
is negligence and that the verdict here is thus corectly founded thereon. Respondents cite on page 19
the case of Aittomobile Miliual Indemnity Company
v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938) for the
proposition that the test of bad faith is what a man
of ordinary care and prudence would do. This is
misleading for that case, on a careful reading, establishes a contrary rule. On page 859 of the opinion
the court pointed out by reference to another case
that a verdict of bad faith cannot be supported upon
a theory of negligence, (Emphasis ours) or implied
contract, but must be bottomed on a finding of bad
faith which the Court defined as a decision to reject
an offer of settlement without honest or intelligent
3
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consideration. The Court i·ecognized; however, that a
factor in bad faith could be negligent investigation of
the facts in the case. In the present action even Tel
Charlier, counsel for Respondent Soliz, admitted that
Appellant had through its investigation acquired
all the evidence as to injuries, losses and expenses
that was known to exist ( R 320). Thus a claim now
of negligent investigation is refuted by the testimony of Respondents' own counsel. Thus the case
really stands for the proposition which has been accepted by the great majority of courts and impliedly
by Utah - that bad faith is not negligence, but
rather is a dishonest or fraudulent refusal to settle
within the policy limits.
Respondents' citation of Tiger Rii,er Pipe Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 163 S.C. 229,
161 S.E. 491 ( 1931) on page 18 of their brief is
also misleading as to the issue of duty. Appellant
conceded in its first Brief that the fairest rule for
all concerned was that the insurer owed a duty of
equal consideration to itself and its insureds. Ironically Respondents appear to take issue with this,
and in doing so cite the only case known by Appellan t to exist where a court has pronounced the duty
of the insurer to be that of sacrificing its own interest in favor of the insured. This is absurd, and
seems to have no place in this case except to further
confuse the issues on appeal. It is interesting to note
that subsequent to that case a Federal District Court
in South Carolina, in the case of Bluebird Taxi Co;·4
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porotion v. Anierican Fidelity And Casualty Company, 26 F. Supp. 808 (D.C.S.C.) approved a directed verdict for an insurer in a bad faith case largely
on the testimony of two defense lawyers as expert
witnesses, and in so doing disapproved the test
stated in the Tiger River case, supra, because it
would result in fraud and defeat the effectiveness
and purpose of insurance.
In Point II Respondents mix together all the
theories as to duty and standard of care and come
up with no test. This appears to be an effort to
provide an exnansive and undefined runway upon
which to land their verdict. Respondents' position
appears to be that by adding inference upon inferen~e and insinuation upon insinuation the apparition of bad faith will suddenly appear. This Respondents do in their application of the facts. Some
examples are:

On page 24, where it is said that it could
be inferred that the activity check was not
introduced because it was disastrous to the
insurer and thus showed bad faith (despite
the complete lack of evidence as to the content
and relevancy of the check) .
On page 25, where Respondents infer bad
faith from the faet that the Company's initial offer was $4,500.00 and not the $6,000.00
value given the case by defendant's counsel
conditioned upon an independent medical ex-5
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amination being performed.
On page 23, where Respondents infer
bad faith because Dr. Bernson was unequiYocal and Dr. Clegg was not so unequivocal (despite testimony by one expert that unequivocal
statements by a doctor in reference to a spinal
disc, made without benefit of an operation,
are suspect ( R. 343, Tr. 209) ) .
On page 22 Respondents raise an inference of support for their position from the
testimony of Soliz's wife in the first action,
which testimony was not presented as evidence
in the trial of the present action.
What all this amounts to is an attempt to base
a verdict of bad faith on weak and even non-existent inferences instead of on clear and convincing
evidence of dishonesty. This requirement is made
clear in the case of Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 134 Atl. (2d) 223 Penn. (1957) where
the court affirmed a directed verdict in defendant's
favor on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. There the plaintiff tried to
prove bad faith by showing that a prior trial resulted in a judgment for $100,000.00, although a
new trial was subsequently granted; on retrial the
insured requested settlement for $45,000.00 (which
was $20,000.00 over the policy limits) with the insured offering to pay $10,000.00 of that sum; letters
in reference to the offer sent to the insurer during
6
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-the trial were not answered; and insurer's counsel
allegedly said that his job was to try cases, not
to settle them. The defendant was counting on a
"no cause of action" based on the lack of proximate
cause. The judgment, however, was for $90,000.00
and was upheld on appeal.
In the ensuing bad faith action the trial court
directed a verdict against the plaintiffs for insufficient evidence. The court, in affirming, said:
"The appellant, however, appears to be
wholly unmindful of the law's requirement
that bad faith must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and not merely insinuated. As the late Judge Columbus, who was
the trial judge in the instant case, sagely observed in the opinion for the Court in Banc,
'the adversity encountered by Cowden has the
unfortunate tendency to obscure, magnify and
distort out of proportion the behavior and action of the defendant and its agents in defending the Philips claim. The jury's verdict
confirmed the fears of Cowden and his pri·.
ate counsel and verified the basis of their concern as expressed in letters sent to Schmidt
(counsel for insurer). However, it does not
of itself lend substance to the charge of bad
faith, proof of which is essential to the plaintiff's recovery. It is merely proof that the results of Saturday's contest are more certainly
stated on the following Monday than they are
.... predictable on the preceding Friday... '
A number of instances are cited by the Appellant, the cumulative effect whereof proves, as
he contends, that the defendant was guilty of
bad faith in its handling of the Philips claim.
1

-
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Neither separately no1· together do the matters which the Appellant thus cites constitute
any proof of bad faith on the part of the defendant ... ". (Emphasis ours)
As to the statement by the defendant's counsel
that his job was to try cases, not to settle them, the
court said:
" ... but accepting fo1· present pm·poses
. that it was said just as Cowden related, still
it was not inconsistent with the bona fide decision that the defendant by trial, had a good
chance of relieving Cowden, as well as itself,
from liability. Was the defendant required to
pay out $25,000 of its own money in order
to compensate for Cowden's failure to carry
adequate insurance . . . " (Supra, at 229)
The position of the Respondents here is no different essentially from the plaintiff in that case.
Not only do the Respondents rely upon insinuations and inferences, but they also misconceive the
question at issue here. The issue is whether or not
the defendant acted in bad faith in not settling for
$9,000.00 before trial and $10,000.00 during trial.
Yet Respondents on page 25 of their Brief attempt
to frame the issue around Appellant's failure to offer
its full tentative settlement evaluation in response
to Respondents' initial offer of $9,000.00. In other
words, Resepondents now allege that Appellant was
guilty of bad faith in refusing to offer $6,000.00
despite the fact that the evidence shows that the
$6,000.00 value arrived at by counsel for the de8
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fendant was conditioned upon the obtaining of an inclependant medical examination, and despite the fact
that Respondents made no further effort to negotiate
a reasonable settlement by offering less than the original $9,000.00. The respondents a1·e advocating an
apprnach condemned in the previously cited Bluebird Taxi case, supra, whe1·e the court warned
against proteding only the insured's interest since
it would enable the plaintiffs to make one offer
which would probably not be accepted and then, in
collaboration with the insured, sue for the excess,
if any, on the theory that the insurer acted in bad
faith in not offering its full value in immediate
response to the plaintiff's initial offer.
Respondents also err on page 27 in stating as
a proposition of law that bad faith is shown if the
insm·er knew the jury "might" bring back a verdict in excess of the limits. This is clearly contrary
to reason and to the law applied in bad faith cases,
since a jury "might" do anything, thus making all
defenses "bad faith" cases if an excess verdict occurs. Even the Respondents should hesitate to advocate such a test for bad faith.
The issue in t};.is appeal is whether there was
clear and convincing evidence showing that the decision of the Appellant was dishonest or fraudulent
in that it knew the jury could be reasonably expected
to bring back a verdict in excess of the policy limits.
The plethora of inferences and insinuations present9
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ed at trial and now argued by the Respondents in
their Brief fail to satisfy this test, for at most they
only show that in retrospect the facts, interpreted
in favor of the Respondents, are sufficient to support a verdict in the first action in Soliz' favor. The
lack of facts indicating a dishonest evaluation is
obvious. However, the facts showing an honest and
reasonable evaluation are numerous. Even Respondents' expert witness, Louis Medgley, placed the
settlement value at $7,500.00 (R. 238).
The Respondents in the trial of this action and
in their Brief have failed to present any clear and
convincing evidence of bad faith, but merely
show by inferences and insinuations that in truth
the results of Saturday's contest are more certainly
stated on the following Monday than they are predictable on the preceding Friday.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III
Respondents in their Point III confuse the attorney-client privilege involved in this case with
situations where such relationship does not exist.
On page 30 of Respondents' Brief the case therein
cited deals not with the insurance company and
its counsel but rather with the insurance company
and the State Insurance Department - clearly a
different situation and one not calling for a privilege. Respondents also on page 30 of their Brief discuss the right of the client to waive that privilege.
Appellant agrees that the client may waive the pri10
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vilege, but in the present case the client was the deffendant insurance company which did not waive
the privilege and, therefore, no exception applies.
The additional cases cited in Point III of Respondents' Brief can be distinguished from the present situation since in those cases the insured was
not represented personally by other counsel but
rather relied wholly upon the insurance company's
counsel and in effect adopted said counsel as their
own. Appellant does not contend that the insurance
company's general file is not to be made available
in such cases; however, Appellant does contend
that under a situation such as that now presented
where the insured has his own counsel and the materials to be dis-:overed are confidential communic2tions between the insurance company and its counsel
no exception does exist to the attorney-client privilege regardless of the materiality of the matter.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV.
Respondents appear to have missed the point
in their argument under designated Point IV. Appellant readily agrees with Respondents that under
the terms of the insurance contract issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to Edward Wilson Ammerman a right of action against the company for the
policy amount is afforded those who recover a judgment. No one disputes that principle of law, but the
issue here is whether or not the judgment creditor
may bring a tort action for the excess above the
11
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policy limits against the insurance company on a
violation of a duty owed to the insured, Edward
Wilson Ammennan. Respondents have failed to discern the dividing line between the cases on this matter as pointed out in Appellant's first Brief. It has
been held that where the policy expressly gives the
judgment creditor all of the rights belonging to the
insured the judgment creditor is a proper party
in a bad faith action because the full rights of thr
insured have been assigned by the policy to the
judgment creditor. However, it has been uniformly
held that where the insurance policy merely gives
the judgment creditor a right of action under the
policy this is limited to a direct suit against the insurance company to collect the policy amount, and
in no way assigns the collateral personal rights of
the insured to the judgment creditor. In a very recent case, Tabben v. Ohio Casualty Insurance C01npany, 250 F. Supp. 853 (1966) the court dismissed
the complaint of the judgment creditor on the ground
that no legal injury was incurred by the judgment
creditor because no duty was owed to him by the
insurer, and no actual injury occurred since the
judgment creditor received by the judgment more
than he would have by the settlement. The cases
cited by Respondents in their Brief to support their
proposition all contain policy provisions assigning
to the judgment creditor by the policy all of the
rights possessed by the insured. Respondents do not
cite any cases wherein the judgment creditor is al12
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lowed to bring suit on bad faith under a policy such
as that issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange
which allows the judgment creditor to sue subject to
the terms and limitations of the policy for the
amount of the judgment. It seems clear that Soliz's
presence in this lawsuit was prejudicial to a fair
determination of the issue of bad faith by creating
an appearance to the jury that the plaintiff Soliz
was merely re-trying the original case in order to
collect the remainder of the judgment. Moreover,
the court further compounded this error by giving
the judgment creditor a judgment for the excess
over the policy limits, which is clearly error and contrary to the authorities in this area construing the
rights of the judgment creditor, including the analagous case of Paul v. Kirkendall decided by this
court at 6 Utah (2d) 256, 311 Pac. (2d) 376.
Appellant therefore respectfully submits that
the record of this case and the Brief of Respondents
fail to sustain the verdict rendered by the jury and
instead the record clearly shows, as does the indecisiveness of Respondents' Brief, that there was not
any clear and convincing evidence of bad faith by
defendant in failing to settle for $9,000.00 before
trial or $10,000.00 during trial; and that further
prejudicial error was committed by allowing the
13
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plaintiff Soliz to prosecute the lawsuit and by allowing in evidence a confidential communication between the insurance company and its counsel.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

